CONSUMER: Lodging

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Reasons for this report<br>$\checkmark$ Our analysis of the most recent weekly US lodging results

# Lodging: US RevPAR +43\% Y/Y Last Week. +5\% vs. 2019. A bit of a softer week for urban + group 

Overall U.S. RevPAR was $+42.8 \% \mathrm{y} / \mathrm{y}$ for the week ending 4/2/2022, per STR, softer than the prior week's result of $+55.5 \%$. Last week's RevPAR was up against a $+287.6 \%$ comparable result in 2021 vs. $+255.2 \%$ in the prior week. On a $3-y$ ear run-rate (vs. 2019), RevPAR was $\mathbf{+ 4 . 5 \%}$ vs. $+7.3 \%$ in the prior week's 3-year run-rate.

Last week looked to us a bit softer on urban and group versus the prior week; given the materiality of group demand to urban markets we assume a softer group week drove urban relative weakness.

Last week also had a Ramadan calendar shift and some flight cancellations which may have also contributed to the softness.

We view a somewhat softer sequential group week vs. 2019 driving softer headline national results especially in major urban markets. Group occupancy was -29.3\% vs. the comparable 2019 week relative to $-25.7 \%$ for the running 28 day average. Comparatively, Transient occupancy was $-4.7 \%$ vs. $-7.7 \%$, respectively. Transient ADR percent change was also 14 points higher than Group both last week and over the last month suggesting that leisure demand (especially luxury travel) is running strong and Group demand less so. Taking out weddings and other social groups would widen the comparisons between the performance/recovery of corporate and leisure demand.

- When weekday/corporate group is soft and without as much positive benefit from Spring Break demand to some urban markets as may have been the case earlier in March, there is an outsized impact to urban travel which we can also see in some of the Top 25 city results. Big city rooms supply and high room rates can materially impact the national results given the number of hotel rooms in these markets. Several major markets last week had absolute occupancy about 300-400+ bps below the running 28 day average, including Houston, Miami, Orange County CA, San Francisco, and Tampa. We note that while non-Spring Break periods can also be positive for higher-end corporate travel, we are not yet at the place where fly-to corporate travel has largely recovered to pre-pandemic levels, so we overweight the leisure demand impact to March results.
- Flight cancellations last week may also have played a factor in the sequential national hotel performance; between flight cancellations/weather and the Ramadan calendar shift discussed below, we are unsure the extent of impact from these two factors to last week's hotel results.

We add -- with importance -- that investors should not use a few weeks of data to make big assumptions about the recovery of certain markets or higher-rated corporate travel as a whole. Hotel demand generally goes up and down in more gradual patterns except from a negative demand shock. As we used to write more often pre-pandemic, one week does not make a trend and that is especially relevant for struggling markets like San Francisco. San Francisco midweek occupancy maxed out in the low 60 s\% last week versus $82 \%$ in the prior week (driven in part by the Game Developers convention at the Moscone Convention Center and NCAA basketball).

While headlines results can be deceivingly positive or negative from week to week especially without normalization of convention activity/fly-to business travel/ international inbound demand, we can for now still use 2019 vs. 2022 as a relatively clean comp comparison until closer to the Easter/Passover period (where corporate travel is pushed forward due to the holidays). One existing calendar shift is the start of Ramadan which commenced in the evening of Sunday, May 5th in 2019 versus Saturday, April 2nd in 2022. Industry leaders have suggested in recent years of the rising consideration of Ramadan for scheduling events.

Major RevPAR statistics presented below:

- Luxury RevPAR: +47.4\% y/y and +9.9\% over 3 years
- Upper Upscale RevPAR: +88.4\% y/y and $-9.5 \%$ over 3 years;
- Upscale RevPAR: +55.3\% y/y and -4.6\% over 3 years;
- Upper Midscale RevPAR: +37.5\% y/y and $+4.6 \%$ over 3 years;
- Midscale RevPAR: $+23.7 \%$ y/y and $+8.6 \%$ over 3 years;
- Economy RevPAR: $+12.6 \%$ y/y and $+12.4 \%$ over 3 years;
- Independent hotels ( $\sim 1 / 3 \mathrm{rd}$ of the data set) RevPAR: $+26.0 \% \mathrm{y} / \mathrm{y}$ and $+15.6 \%$ over 3 years; and
- Within Upper Upscale \& Luxury class hotels:
oGroup: $+383.2 \%$ y/y vs. $+341.8 \%$ prior week; over 3 years: $-23.8 \%$ vs $-12.1 \%$ prior week.
oTransient: +24.7\% y/y vs. +56.0\% prior week; over 3 years: $+15.7 \%$ vs $+21.6 \%$ prior week.


## March and 1Q22 estimates:

- For the month of March, we estimate that full-service branded domestic hotels (the typical Hilton [HLT, Hold], Hyatt [H, Buy], or Marriott [MAR, Hold] hotel) will finish approximately $\mathbf{+ 9 5 - 1 0 5 \%}$ for Luxury, $+115-125 \%$ for Upper Upscale, and $\mathbf{+ 6 3 - 7 0 \%}$ for Upscale full-service. We estimate that the overall industry will finish approximately $\mathbf{+ 5 8 - 6 4 \%}$. Please note that reported monthly results include hotels that are not in the weekly data set.
oOn a 3-year basis for March, we estimate:
■Overall industry RevPAR: +0-5\%
■Luxury RevPAR: +5-15\%
■Upper Upscale RevPAR: -13\% to -7\%
■Upscale RevPAR: -8\% to -3\%
- For 1Q, we estimate that full-service branded domestic hotels (the typical Hilton [HLT, Hold], Hyatt [H, Buy], or Marriott [MAR, Hold] hotel) will finish approximately $\mathbf{+ 1 1 0 - 1 2 0 \%}$ for Luxury, +120-130\% for Upper Upscale, and +65-75\% for Upscale full-service. We estimate that the overall industry will finish approximately $\mathbf{+ 6 5 - 7 0 \%}$.
oOn a 3-year basis for 1Q, we estimate:
■Overall industry RevPAR: $-1 \%$ to $-5 \%$
■Luxury RevPAR: -1\% to -7\%
■Upper Upscale RevPAR: $-18 \%$ to $-24 \%$
■Upscale RevPAR: $-8 \%$ to $-15 \%$
Last week's RevPAR details and sequential trends:
- Headline RevPAR was $+42.8 \% \mathrm{y} / \mathrm{y}$ vs. the running 28 -day average of $+56.1 \% \mathrm{y} / \mathrm{y}$.
- Occupancy: Absolute occupancy was $64.1 \%$ yly vs. the running 28 -day average of $64.9 \% \mathrm{y} / \mathrm{y}$.
- Absolute Group occupancy was slightly higher at a headline but please see our above comments for comparisons to 2019: $19.1 \%$ last week vs. $18.7 \%$ for the running 28 days.

As far as stocks, we reiterate our view the companies relatively best positioned here in our coverage universe are the drive-to leisure-centric C-Corps CHH (Hold), WH (Buy), and RLJ (Buy) for the value-play business traveler in the early corporate demand recovery, H (Buy) for its increased leisure exposure and plans to divest materially from its owned assets, and the timeshare companies, HGV (Buy), VAC (Buy), BVH (Buy), and TNL (Buy, formerly WYND).
While the broader economy may have a U-shaped recovery, we believe hotel operating performance will take substantially longer to recover and be much choppier and vary by segmentation and geography. Additionally, we believe work from home will have a short-to-medium impact on hotel demand, though the longer-term impact is still unknown. While some travel industry leaders, news reporters, and businesspeople have predicted that $35-50 \%$ of business travel will be permanently lost, our view is that it will be far less than $35-50 \%$, though it will not be zero either (Hospitality Net).

## Weekly RevPAR Summary

|  | YoY \% change in RevPAR |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | U.s. | Luxury | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Upper } \\ & \text { Upscale } \end{aligned}$ | Upscale | Upper Midscale | Midscale | Economy | Independent | New York | Boston | LA | Chicaao | DC |
| 12/18/2021 | 107.6\% | 238.8\% | 218.1\% | 114.1\% | 82.8\% | 57.0\% | 37.8\% |  | 349.6\% | 170.7\% | 148.2\% | 183.8\% | 124.2\% |
| 12/25/2021 | 90.7\% | 182.5\% | 145.7\% | 88.5\% | 75.9\% | 54.7\% | 36.4\% | 83.5\% | 208.3\% | 14.2 | 144.2\% | 5.5 | 82.6\% |
| 11/2022 | 94.4\% | 145.7\% | 144.9\% | 95.4\% | 82.3\% | 62.8\% | 40.3\% | 82.0\% | 200.5\% | 145.9\% | 199.5\% | 122.8\% | 99.8\% |
| 1/8/2022 | 67.0\% | 125.5\% | 130.3\% | 65.7\% | 52.8\% | 40.2\% | 24.7\% | 66.2\% | 63.0\% | 93.3\% | 99.8\% | 60.0\% | 6.6\% |
| 1/15/2022 | 66.2\% | 135.1\% | 124.8\% | 67.9\% | 52.7\% | 39.0\% | 25.1\% | 60.1\% | 50.0\% | 91.7\% | 100.0\% | 69.8\% | 2.9\% |
| 1/22/2022 | 64.9\% | 138.1\% | 115.9\% | 61.3\% | 49.4\% | 39.0\% | 25.3\% | 63.5\% | 56.0\% | 85.2\% | 91.2\% | 76.1\% | -37.9 |
| 1/29/2022 | 67.4\% | 145.4\% | 131.9\% | 69.9\% | 51.6\% | 39.4\% | 23.7\% | 59.5\% | 49.5\% | 109.7\% | 95.0\% | 67.3\% | 5.9\% |
| 25/2022 | 68.2\% | 132.9\% | 130.9\% | 67.6\% | 51.7\% | 40.3\% | 25.0\% | 63.7\% | 52.4\% | 97.1\% | 105.1\% | 73.3\% | 23.6\% |
| 2/12/2022 | 62.6\% | 106.9\% | 111.3\% | 65.7\% | 50.8\% | 37.9\% | 24.3\% | 51.4\% | 81.3\% | 90.8\% | 226.1\% | 56.7\% | 35.9 |
| 2/91/2022 | 69.1\% | 93.8\% | 125.1\% | 74.2\% | 59.6\% | 46.5\% | 29.4\% | 55.2\% | 73.8\% | 116.5\% | 152.0\% | 67.2\% | 70.9 |
| 2/26/2022 | 93.8\% | 173.1\% | 169.7\% | 89.6\% | 66.0\% | 53.5\% | 34.8\% | 90.7\% | 105.3\% | 162.2\% | 116.4\% | 105.2\% | 3\% |
| 3/5/2022 | 74.7\% | 128.1\% | 143.6\% | 74.3\% | 55.3\% | 46.0\% | 31.9\% | 65.5\% | 110.5\% | 164.5\% | 96.8\% | 95.3\% | 112.0\% |
| 3/12/2022 | 70.1\% | 114.6\% | 135.3\% | 72.2\% | 51.3\% | 41.2\% | 29.6\% | 58.4\% | 133.9\% | 172.2\% | 101.9\% | 104.3\% | 127.0\% |
| 3/19/2022 | 58.5\% | 99.7\% | 108.7\% | 64.2\% | 44.1\% | 30.3\% | 17.8\% | 46.9\% | 148.7\% | 172.4\% | 95.9\% | 96.3\% | 147.4\% |
| 3/26/2022 | 55.5\% | 93.0\% | 109.8\% | 62.8\% | 39.5\% | 25.5\% | 14.1\% | 43.6\% | 145.1\% | 203.3\% | 100.0\% | 100.9\% | 162.3\% |
| 4/2/2022 | 42.8\% | 47.4\% | 88.4\% | 55.3\% | 37.5\% | 23.7\% | 12.6\% | 26.0\% | 132.6\% | 144.7\% | 60.6\% | 70.7\% | 137.0\% |
|  | A bit sotter | ro Group a s. prior wee | and Urban |  | Upper U | Upscale and | Upscale led the | the industry |  | Boston an | DC led the T | Top 5 marh |  |
| 1 Q18 | 3.5\% | 6.6\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% | 3.0\% | 3.8\% | 5.3\% | 3.8\% | 7.1\% | 2.6\% | 2.7\% | 5.8\% | -11.0\% |
| 2 Q 18 | 4.0\% | 4.9\% | 3.4\% | 2.8\% | 3.0\% | 4.1\% | 3.1\% | 4.6\% | 4.2\% | -1.2\% | 0.6\% | 4.0\% | 3.1\% |
| 3 Q 18 | 1.7\% | 3.3\% | 1.9\% | 0.8\% | -0.5\% | 0.1\% | 1.8\% | 2.2\% | 0.7\% | 2.8\% | 1.3\% | 7.5\% | -3.4\% |
| $4 \mathrm{Q18}$ | 2.4\% | 3.0\% | 1.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.5\% | 1.3\% | 2.9\% | 4.9\% | 3.5\% | 12.2\% | 3.0\% | 2.8\% | -3.4\% |
| 1 1019 | 1.5\% | -0.7\% | 1.2\% | 0.5\% | 0.4\% | -0.1\% | 1.9\% | 3.1\% | -7.1\% | -2.1\% | -1.7\% | -4.5\% | -2.4\% |
| 2 Q 19 | 1.1\% | 1.1\% | 0.5\% | -0.4\% | 0.0\% | -0.7\% | 1.7\% | 2.4\% | -1.8\% | 4.5\% | 1.6\% | -0.1\% | -1.5\% |
| $3 \mathrm{Q19}$ | 0.7\% | 1.3\% | 1.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.1\% | -1.0\% | -0.9\% | 1.6\% | -2.2\% | -0.4\% | -0.2\% | -2.2\% | 4.5\% |
| $4 \mathrm{Q19}$ | 0.7\% | 3.6\% | 1.0\% | -0.6\% | -1.0\% | -2.7\% | -1.5\% | 2.3\% | -4.1\% | -11.6\% | 1.1\% | -0.7\% | 5.2\% |
| 1020 | -19.3\% | -21.4\% | -23.1\% | -20.8\% | -19.1\% | -16.8\% | -11.2\% | -16.7\% | -28.0\% | -24.5\% | -19.3\% | -21.0\% | -23.2\% |
| 2 Q 20 | -69.9\% | -86.8\% | -86.7\% | -74.8\% | -65.4\% | -51.3\% | -35.0\% | -65.2\% | -76.9\% | -88.2\% | -74.5\% | -83.7\% | -83.7\% |
| 3020 | -48.5\% | -72.0\% | -71.8\% | -55.2\% | -41.7\% | -29.7\% | -19.0\% | -39.0\% | -77.6\% | -79.1\% | -58.4\% | -73.4\% | -68.0\% |
| 4 Q 20 | . $50.6 \%$ | -71.4\% | -72.4\% | -55.5\% | -40.6\% | -26.3\% | -14.5\% | -43.5\% | -81.0\% | -76.1\% | -59.3\% | -75.4\% | -71.4\% |
| 1 Q21 | -27.7\% | -42.7\% | -54.4\% | -34.3\% | -17.4\% | 5.9\% | 4.1\% | -18.0\% | -48.4\% | -56.7\% | -45.3\% | -45.0\% | -43.5\% |
| 2021 | 160.4\% | 391.1\% | 305.3\% | 173.3\% | 150.1\% | 100.7\% | 61.1\% | 162.0\% | 73.8\% | 192.1\% | 166.4\% | 158.3\% | 126.2\% |
| 3 Q 21 | 83.8\% | 201.3\% | 162.9\% | 91.2\% | 72.8\% | 56.4\% | 39.5\% | 71.1\% | 169.2\% | 207.8\% | 95.8\% | 166.4\% | 96.9\% |
| 4 Q 21 | 96.4\% | 215.5\% | 185.6\% | 98.3\% | 74.2\% | 55.2\% | 37.2\% | 86.4\%, | 273.7\% | 225.6\% | 124.8\% | 195.9\% | 129.6\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | YoY | change in | ADR |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | U.S. | Luxury | Upper Upscale | Upscale | Upper Midscale | Midscale | Economy | Independent | New York | Boston | LA | Chicago | DC |
| 12/18/2021 | 42.1\% | 24.6\% | 39.5\% | 33.9\% | 27.8\% | 21.8\% | 18.4\% | 41.8\% | 123.3\% | 47.4\% | 52.7\% | 56.9\% | 36.0\% |
| 12/25/2021 | 40.1\% | 34.6\% | 35.9\% | 31.9\% | 26.5\% | 20.9\% | 18.0\% | 39.2\% | 87.4\% | 38.3\% | 52.4\% | 43.9\% | 25.2\% |
| 1/1/2022 | 45.7\% | 31.3\% | 44.6\% | 41.6\% | 34.3\% | 26.1\% | 22.6\% | 42.7\% | 106.8\% | 42.9\% | 71.9\% | 47.1\% | 29.1\% |
| 1/8/2022 | 36.4\% | 29.5\% | 36.9\% | 29.4\% | 24.3\% | 18.8\% | 17.1\% | 39.3\% | 36.5\% | 34.5\% | 48.3\% | 32.3\% | 1.1\% |
| 1/15/2022 | 36.6\% | 35.2\% | 39.7\% | 31.7\% | 25.7\% | 19.3\% | 17.2\% | 36.0\% | 40.4\% | 35.3\% | 49.7\% | 35.4\% | 11.8 |
| 1/22/2022 | 35.5\% | 35.7\% | 37.7\% | 28.5\% | 24.0\% | 19.2\% | 16.6\% | 36.7\% | 41.9\% | 33.7\% | 49.0\% | 36.7\% | -7.5\% |
| 1/29/2022 | 36.1\% | 30.5\% | 40.2\% | 30.5\% | 24.5\% | 19.0\% | 16.1\% | 34.8\% | 36.8\% | 38.2\% | 52.2\% | 34.3\% | 13.8\% |
| 25/2022 | 36.3\% | 27.0\% | 37.9\% | 29.3\% | 24.3\% | 19.3\% | 16.8\% | 37.2\% | 40.2\% | 38.5\% | 54.7\% | 34.8\% | 18.7\% |
| 2/12/2022 | 33.9\% | 22.7\% | 36.2\% | 30.9\% | 24.3\% | 18.8\% | 16.5\% | 30.3\% | 44.8\% | 35.6\% | 133.7\% | 27.5\% | 23.5\% |
| 2/91/2022 | 37.3\% | 19.8\% | 40.4\% | 36.1\% | 30.3\% | 24.6\% | 20.2\% | 31.5\% | 42.9\% | 42.8\% | 83.2\% | 33.4\% | 30.7\% |
| 2/266/2022 | 47.7\% | 39.4\% | 47.5\% | 39.5\% | 32.6\% | 26.2\% | 21.8\% | 47.4\% | 42.9\% | 47.9\% | 54.6\% | 43.1\% | 29.4\% |
| 3/5/2022 | 39.6\% | 18.4\% | 41.3\% | 35.5\% | 29.8\% | 23.6\% | 20.6\% | 35.7\% | 50.0\% | 55.9\% | 51.4\% | 42.2\% | 47.0\% |
| 3/12/2022 | 40.1\% | 19.3\% | 43.7\% | 37.1\% | 30.5\% | 24.0\% | 20.7\% | 34.9\% | 57.9\% | 61.6\% | 52.3\% | 46.4\% | 52.0\% |
| 3/19/2022 | 39.2\% | 27.2\% | 40.3\% | 37.8\% | 30.4\% | 22.4\% | 18.4\% | 33.7\% | 64.5\% | 63.9\% | 54.7\% | 46.9\% | 58.8\% |
| 3/2662022 | 37.1\% | 17.5\% | 37.7\% | 36.5\% | 28.0\% | 20.7\% | 16.6\% | 30.8\% | 67.0\% | 79.1\% | 55.4\% | 52.5\% | 64.8\% |
| 4/2/2022 | 28.6\% | 7.2\% | 31.5\% | 32.5\% | 26.2\% | 18.9\% | 14.3\% | 19.3\% | 69.1\% | 66.2\% | 41.3\% | 39.3\% | 64.6\% |
| 1 Q18 | 2.5\% | 4.5\% | 1.0\% | 1.7\% | 2.0\% | 3.0\% | 4.0\% | 3.1\% | 3.5\% | 1.0\% | 4.0\% | 1.4\% | -9.4\% |
| $2 \mathrm{Q18}$ | 2.9\% | 3.5\% | 2.9\% | 2.4\% | 2.1\% | 2.6\% | 2.7\% | 3.1\% | 3.7\% | -0.1\% | 2.1\% | 3.3\% | 2.4\% |
| 3 Q 18 | 2.1\% | 3.3\% | 2.4\% | 1.8\% | 1.2\% | 1.3\% | 1.2\% | 1.9\% | 1.2\% | 1.9\% | 1.1\% | 6.7\% | -0.8\% |
| $4 \mathrm{Q18}$ | 2.0\% | 3.7\% | 2.2\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.9\% | 0.6\% | 2.9\% | 3.4\% | 5.6\% | 1.4\% | 2.2\% | -2.1\% |
| 1019 | 1.1\% | 2.2\% | 2.5\% | 1.0\% | 0.8\% | -0.2\% | -0.3\% | 1.0\% | -3.8\% | 0.7\% | -1.0\% | -2.4\% | 1.5\% |
| 2 Q 19 | 1.2\% | 2.5\% | 1.4\% | 0.6\% | 0.7\% | -0.2\% | 0.6\% | 1.7\% | -1.0\% | 3.2\% | 0.8\% | -1.7\% | 0.2\% |
| 3019 | 0.8\% | 1.5\% | 1.3\% | 0.2\% | -0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.5\% | 1.6\% | -1.9\% | 0.9\% | -0.2\% | -2.8\% | 4.0\% |
| 4 Q 19 | 0.7\% | 2.4\% | 0.6\% | -0.4\% | -0.3\% | -1.0\% | -1.0\% | 1.9\% | . $3.7 \%$ | 5.5\% | 0.3\% | -2.2\% | 3.9\% |
| 1 Q20 | -4.0\% | 1.6\% | -1.4\% | -2.9\% | -3.1\% | -3.8\% | -3.8\% | -2.3\% | 8.6\% | -6.2\% | -2.7\% | -2.6\% | -6.8\% |
| 2 Q 20 | -37.1\% | -22.0\% | -34.0\% | -30.0\% | -23.1\% | -17.1\% | -14.6\% | -34.8\% | -52.3\% | -56.9\% | -40.5\% | -53.7\% | -48.8\% |
| 3 Q 20 | -24.1\% | -12.6\% | -25.6\% | -24.2\% | -17.3\% | -11.6\% | -9.4\% | -16.1\% | -47.7\% | -47.3\% | -31.6\% | -43.2\% | -34.5\% |
| $4 \mathrm{Q20}$ | -27.2\% | -11.1\% | -29.0\% | -26.9\% | -17.8\% | -10.4\% | -5.9\% | -20.9\% | -54.1\% | -45.5\% | -29.2\% | -44.8\% | -40.7\% |
| 1021 | -19.6\% | 3.4\% | -23.4\% | -23.0\% | -14.2\% | -6.3\% | -1.5\% | -12.1\% | -28.3\% | -32.7\% | -29.7\% | 25.7\% | -27.9\% |
| 2 Q 21 | 43.2\% | 37.8\% | 30.6\% | 21.3\% | 23.1\% | 20.4\% | 18.6\% | 52.6\% | 33.5\% | 38.0\% | 42.5\% | 46.1\% | 23.1\% |
| 3021 | 36.2\% | 31.8\% | 35.0\% | 29.7\% | 28.3\% | 23.5\% |  | 32.8\% | 64.2\% | 57.7\% | 43.1\% | 59.6\% | 29.4\% |
| 4021 | 41.5\% | 29.6\% | 41.9\% | 34.2\% | 28.5\% | 22.9\% | 18.8\% | 39.2\% | 99.6\% | 69.6\% | 46.1\% | 64.9\% | 41.6\% |


|  | YoY \% change in Occupancy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | U.S. | Luxury | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Upper } \\ & \text { Upscale } \end{aligned}$ | Upscale | Upper Midscale | Midscale | Economy | Independent | New York | Boston | LA | Chicago | DC |
| 12/18/2021 | 46.0\% | 171.9\% | 128.1\% | 59.9\% | 43.0\% | 28.9\% | 16.3\% | 39.6\% | 101.4\% | 83.6\% | 62.5\% | 80.9\% | 64.9\% |
| 12/25/2021 | 36.1\% | 110.0\% | 80.8\% | 42.9\% | 39.1\% | 28.0\% | 15.6\% | 31.9\% | 64.5\% | 60.8\% | 60.2\% | 49.7\% | 45.8\% |
| 1/1/2022 | 33.4\% | 87.1\% | 69.4\% | 38.0\% | 35.8\% | 29.1\% | 14.5\% | 27.5\% | 45.3\% | 72.0\% | 74.2\% | 51.5\% | 54.8\% |
| 1/8/2022 | 22.5\% | 74.1\% | 68.2\% | 28.0\% | 22.9\% | 18.0\% | 6.4\% | 19.3\% | 19.4\% | 43.7\% | 34.7\% | 20.9\% | 5.4\% |
| 1/15/2022 | 21.6\% | 73.9\% | 60.9\% | 27.5\% | 21.5\% | 16.5\% | 6.8\% | 17.6\% | 6.8\% | 41.7\% | 33.5\% | 25.4\% | -8.0\% |
| 1/22/2022 | 21.7\% | 75.5\% | 56.7\% | 25.5\% | 20.5\% | 16.6\% | 7.5\% | 19.7\% | 9.9\% | 38.5\% | 28.3\% | 28.9\% | -32.9\% |
| 1/29/2022 | 23.0\% | 88.1\% | 65.4\% | 30.3\% | 21.8\% | 17.1\% | 6.5\% | 18.3\% | 9.3\% | 51.8\% | 28.1\% | 24.6\% | -17.3\% |
| 215/2022 | 23.3\% | 83.5\% | 67.5\% | 29.5\% | 22.0\% | 17.6\% | 7.1\% | 19.3\% | 8.7\% | 42.3\% | 32.6\% | 28.6\% | 4.1\% |
| 2/12/2022 | 21.4\% | 68.6\% | 55.1\% | 26.6\% | 21.3\% | 16.1\% | 6.7\% | 16.2\% | 25.3\% | 40.7\% | 39.5\% | 22.8\% | 10.1\% |
| 2/19/2022 | 23.2\% | 61.8\% | 60.3\% | 28.0\% | 22.5\% | 17.6\% | 7.7\% | 18.0\% | 21.6\% | 51.6\% | 37.6\% | 25.4\% | 30.8\% |
| 2/26/2022 | 31.2\% | 95.9\% | 82.8\% | 35.9\% | 25.2\% | 21.7\% | 10.7\% | 29.4\% | 43.7\% | 77.3\% | 40.0\% | 43.4\% | 37.9\% |
| 3/5/2022 | 25.2\% | 92.7\% | 72.4\% | 28.6\% | 19.7\% | 18.1\% | 9.4\% | 22.0\% | 40.3\% | 69.7\% | 30.0\% | 37.3\% | 44.2\% |
| 3/12/2022 | 21.4\% | 79.8\% | 63.7\% | 25.5\% | 15.9\% | 13.9\% | 7.3\% | 17.5\% | 48.1\% | 68.4\% | 32.6\% | 39.6\% | 49.3\% |
| 3/19/2022 | 13.9\% | 57.0\% | 48.7\% | 19.2\% | 10.5\% | 6.4\% | -0.5\% | 9.9\% | 51.2\% | 66.2\% | 26.6\% | 33.6\% | 55.9\% |
| 3/26/2022 | 13.5\% | 64.2\% | 52.3\% | 19.3\% | 9.0\% | 4.0\% | -2.2\% | 9.8\% | 46.8\% | 69.3\% | 28.7\% | 31.8\% | 59.2\% |
| 4/2/2022 | 11.0\% | 37.6\% | 43.3\% | 17.2\% | 9.0\% | 4.1\% | -1.5\% | 5.6\% | 37.5\% | 47.3\% | 13.7\% | 22.5\% | 44.0\% |
| 1018 | 0.9\% | 2.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.5\% | 1.1\% | 0.9\% | 1.3\% | 0.7\% | 3.5\% | 3.7\% | -1.3\% | 4.4\% | -1.8\% |
| 2 Q 18 | 1.1\% | 1.3\% | 0.5\% | 0.4\% | 0.9\% | 1.5\% | 0.4\% | 1.5\% | 0.5\% | -1.1\% | -1.4\% | 0.7\% | 0.7\% |
| 3018 | -0.4\% | 0.0\% | -0.5\% | -1.0\% | -1.7\% | -1.1\% | 0.5\% | 0.3\% | -0.5\% | 0.9\% | 0.2\% | 0.7\% | -2.6\% |
| 4018 | 0.4\% | -0.7\% | -1.1\% | -1.6\% | -0.6\% | 0.4\% | 2.3\% | 1.9\%, | 0.1\% | 6.3\% | 1.6\% | 0.6\% | -1.3\% |
| 1019 | 0.4\% | -2.8\% | -1.3\% | -1.4\% | -0.5\% | 0.0\% | 2.3\% | 2.1\% | -3.5\% | -2.8\% | -0.7\% | -2.2\% | -3.8\% |
| 2 Q 19 | -0.1\% | -1.4\% | -0.9\% | -1.0\% | -0.7\% | -0.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | -0.7\% | 1.3\% | 0.8\% | 1.7\% | -1.7\% |
| 3 Q 19 | -0.1\% | -0.2\% | -0.2\% | -0.7\% | 0.0\% | -0.5\% | -0.4\% | 0.0\% | -0.3\% | -1.4\% | 0.1\% | 0.6\% | 0.4\% |
| 4 Q 19 | -0.1\% | 1.2\% | 0.4\% | -0.2\% | -0.8\% | -1.7\% | -0.4\% | 0.4\%, | -0.4\% | -6.5\% | 0.8\% | 1.5\% | 1.3\% |
| 1 Q20 | -15.9\% | -22.6\% | -21.9\% | -18.4\% | -16.5\% | -13.6\% | -7.7\% | -14.8\% | -21.3\% | -19.5\% | -17.1\% | -18.8\% | -17.6\% |
| 2 Q 2 | -52.1\% | -83.0\% | -79.8\% | -64.0\% | -55.1\% | -41.3\% | -23.9\% | -46.6\% | -51.5\% | -72.7\% | -57.1\% | -64.7\% | -68.2\% |
| $3 \mathrm{Q20}$ | -32.2\% | -68.0\% | -62.2\% | -40.9\% | -29.5\% | -20.5\% | -10.6\% | -27.3\% | -57.3\% | -60.3\% | -39.1\% | -53.1\% | -51.2\% |
| 4 Q 20 | -32.1\% | -67.8\% | -61.2\% | -39.1\% | -27.8\% | -17.8\% | -9.1\% | -28.5\%; | -58.7\% | -56.2\% | -42.5\% | -55.5\% | -51.7\% |
| 1021 | -10.1\% | -44.6\% | -40.5\% | -14.7\% | 3.8\% | 0.5\% | 5.6\% | -6.7\%. | -28.0\% | -35.6\% | -22.2\% | -26.0\% | -21.6\% |
| 2 Q 1 | 81.9\% | 256.5\% | 210.5\% | 125.3\% | 103.2\% | 66.7\% | 35.9\% | 71.7\% | 30.2\% | 111.7\% | 86.9\% | 76.8\% | 83.8\% |
| 3 Q 21 | 34.9\% | 128.5\% | 94.7\% | 47.4\% | 34.7\% | 26.6\% | 15.2\% | 28.8\% | 64.0\% | 95.2\% | 36.9\% | 67.0\% | 52.1\% |
| 4 Q 1 | 38.8\% | 143.4\% | 101.3\% | 47.8\% | 35.6\% | 26.3\% | 15.4\% | 33.9\% | 87.3\% | 92.1\% | 53.9\% | 79.4\% | 62.2\% |

Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

RevPAR Component Trends


Source: STR data, Truist Securities research
RevPAR Trends by Chain Scale


[^0]RevPAR Trends by Market (Top 5 markets)


Source: STR data, Truist Securities research
RevPAR Trends by Market (Additional markets)


[^1]RevPAR Component Trends (3-year)


Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

## RevPAR Trends by Chain Scale (3-year)



[^2]RevPAR Trends by Market (3-year) (Top 5 markets)


Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

## RevPAR Trends by Market (3-year) (Additional markets)



[^3]Price Target/Risks Summary

| Lodging | TKR | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Price } \\ & 4 / 5122 \end{aligned}$ | Rating | PT* | $\begin{gathered} \text { \% upsidel } \\ \text { down- } \\ \text { side } \end{gathered}$ | Truist Securities Valuation EBITDA excluding Stock Based Comp/Other |  |  | As Reported/Consensus/Data Aggregator "Headline" EBITDA |  |  | Target EV/EBITDA Multiple | Risks <br> Note: COVID-19 represents a material risk to our entire coverage especially related to the length/severity of the demand shock |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 2021 E EBITDA (\$M)** | 2022E <br> EBITDA <br> (\$M) * | 2023E <br> EBITDA <br> (\$M)** | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 2021E } \\ & \text { EBITDA } \\ & \text { (SMM) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 2022E } \\ \text { EBITDA } \\ (\mathrm{SM})^{*} \end{gathered}$ | 2023E EBITDA (\$M)* |  |  |
| Bluegreen Vacations | BVH | \$27.03 | Buy | \$56 | 109\% | \$122 | \$147 | \$155 | \$17 | \$16 | \$16 | 7.6X | Downside risk: controlled company issues, limited cap/float, loan defaults, and macroeconomic risk. |
| Choice Hotels | CHH | \$141.94 | Hold | \$138 | -3\% | \$392 | \$442 | \$490 | \$404 | \$454 | \$506 | 16.0X | Upside risk: conservative growth of new brands; market share gains. Downside risk: slowdown in development opportunities; market share losses. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Upside risk: faster demand improvement in corporate travel than expected. Brand changes (e.g. Vail) lead to material EBITDA improvement. Leisure hotels hold/improve on RevPAR and margins despite the challenging macro. Downside risk: lodging recovery takes longer than expected, weaker results from ROI projects than forecasted, poor performance of recently acquired assets. |
| DiamondRock Hospitality | DRH | \$9.90 | Hold | \$9 | -9\% | \$83 | \$196 | \$255 | \$84 | \$196 | \$255 | 12.0x |  |
| Hitton | HLT | \$151.55 | Hold | \$152 | 0\% | \$1,470 | \$2,290 | \$2,848 | \$1,629 | \$2,453 | \$3,008 | 17.0x | Upside risk: Macro lodging trends improve beyond expectations. Faster than expected net unit growth. Downside risk: slowing pipeline. Deep 2022 recession. |
| Hilton Grand Vacations | HGV | \$50.49 | Buy | \$63 | 24\% | \$585 | \$865 | \$982 | \$637 | \$932 | \$1,048 | 9.4 x | Downside risk: Disruption in a major market (HGV more concentrated than peers), issues with Japanese customer (HGV more exposed than peers), difficulty sourcing additional fee-for-service inventory deals |
| Host Hotels \& Resorts | HST | \$19.01 | Hold | \$19 | 0\% | \$532 | \$1,145 | \$1,414 | \$532 | \$1,145 | \$1,414 | 12.5X | Upside risk: faster demand improvement in corporate/convention travel than expected. Dispositions at higher multiple that expected (incl. NYC), stronger than expected performance by luxury leisure resorts on both topline and margins through the valuation year. Downside risk: extended industry downturn with particular impact to large big box hotels, weak recovery of international travel during the valuation period, macro demand shook to acquired resort assets, labor issues. |
| Hyatt Hotels | H | \$94.86 | Buy | \$111 | 17\% | \$234 | \$715 | \$979 | \$284 | \$770 | \$1,039 | 14.5X | Downside risk: lodging recovery takes longer than expected. Planned dispositions take longer than expected. Material labor issues to owned hotels. Pipeline growth slower than expected. Apple Leisure Group underperforms 2023 guidance. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Upside risk: Macro lodging trends improve beyond expectations. Faster than expected net unit growth. Downside risk: slowing pipeline. Deep 2022 recession. |
| Marriott International | MAR | \$174.00 | Hold | \$182 | 5\% | \$1,977 | \$3,231 | \$3,870 | \$2,278 | \$3,533 | \$4,185 | 16.8X |  |
| Marriott Vacations | VAC | \$153.75 | Buy | \$201 | 30\% | \$524 | \$342 | \$1,380 | \$657 | \$908 | \$1,026 | 10.0x | Downside risk: M\&A story fades and multiples revert to historical levels Upside risk: faster demand improvement in corporate travel than expected. |
| Park Hotels \& Resorts | PK | \$18.79 | Hold | \$18 | -4\% | \$123 | \$486 | \$686 | \$142 | \$506 |  |  | Upside risk: faster demand improvement in corporate travel than expected. Dispositions at higher multiple than expected. CHSP revenue and asset management strategies lead to faster than expected EBITDA gains. Downside risk: extended industry downturn with particular impact to large big box hotels, weak recovery of international travel during the valuation period especially Oahu, macro demand shock impact to major resort assets, labor issues. |
| Pebblebrook Hotel Trust"* | PEB | \$23.88 | Hold | \$24 | 1\% | \$88 | \$297 | \$435 | \$88 |  |  | 14.5X | Upside Risks: Material near-term incremental EBITDA from Legacy LHO assets. Downside Risks: Incremental EBITDA from major CapEx investments take longer than anticipated, contributing to multiple contraction. Very slow recovery in San Francisco. |
| Playa Hotels \& Resorts | PLYA | \$8.47 | Hold | \$8 | -6\% | \$86 | \$172 | \$216 | \$99 |  | \$229 | 10.0x | Upside risk: quicker recovery post-COVID, Cap Cana group strength/rate growth in the D.R. Downside risk: demand shock, hurricanes, slow ramp up of Cap Cana, country-specific risks (emerging market porttolio) |
| RLJ Lodging Trust** | RLJ | \$13.92 | Buy | \$18 | 29\% | \$145 | \$271 | \$419 |  |  | \$440 | 12.0X | Downside risk: Slower than expected recovery of corporate business travel post-COVID; scope/timing and/or upside from repositionings underwhelms investor expectations; labor costs are not reduced either due to increased wages/benefits or inability to cut costs post-tech improvements |
| Ryman Hospitality Properties | RHP | \$92.95 | Hold | \$85 | -9\% | \$162 | \$448 |  | $\$ 177$ | \$476 | \$559 | 13.0x | Upside risk: recovering group and Entertainment demand faster than expected, better margin recovery. Downside risk: Group demand returns slower than expected. Property-specific risks given a small portfolio. |
| Sunstone Hotel Investors | SHO | \$11.50 | Hold | \$11 | -4\% | \$54 |  |  | \$67 | \$195 | \$248 | 12.5X | Upside risk: faster demand improvement in corporate travel than expected. Renovations lead to faster than expected EBITDA improvements. SHO buys hotels at accretive terms and quickly adds incremental EBITDA during the valuation period. Downside risk: Lodging recovery takes longer than expected, labor issues, weak recovery of international travel to gateway markets, natural disaster risk. Montage EBITDA stabilizes well lower than expected. |
| Vail Resorts, Inc. | MTN | \$254.53 | Hold | \$278 | 9\% |  | $\$ 830$ | \$893 | \$540 | \$830 | \$893 | 16.0x | Downside risks: MTN is subject to prolonged weakness in general economic conditions, including adverse effects on the overall travel and leisure related industries. Upside risks include a faster economic recovery and investors continuing to apply higher target valuation multiples. |
| Travel + Leisure Co. | TNL | \$54.60 | Buy | \$77 | 41\% | \$748 | \$872 | \$998 | \$778 | \$904 | \$1,030 | 8.6X | Downside risk: The timeshare business is especially wilnerable to economic softness. There are potential execution risks post the spin off. |
| Wyndham Hotels \& Resorts | WH | \$84.14 | Buy | \$93 |  | $\$ 562$ | \$579 | \$680 | \$590 | \$616 | \$721 | 15.0x | Downside risk: Slowdown in development opportunities. Weaker than expected transient trends. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| * All of our Lodging price targets are derived by applying a target EV/EBITDA multiple to our estimate for 2023 EBITDA <br> ** Valuation EBITDA excludes select items for specific companies including stock-based compensation. <br> ${ }^{* * *}$ Covered by Gregory J. Miller - gregory.j.miller@truist.com |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: FactSet, Truist Securities research

## Companies Mentioned in This Note

Bluegreen Vacations Holding Corporation (BVH, \$27.03, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)
Choice Hotels International, Inc. (CHH, \$141.94, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
DiamondRock Hospitality Company (DRH, \$9.90, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Hyatt Hotels Corporation (H, \$94.86, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)
Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. (HGV, \$50.49, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. (HLT, \$151.55, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Host Hotels \& Resorts, Inc. (HST, \$19.01, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Marriott International, Inc. (MAR, \$174.00, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN, \$254.53, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Pebblebrook Hotel Trust (PEB, $\$ 23.88$, Hold, Gregory Miller)
Park Hotels \& Resorts Inc. (PK, \$18.79, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Playa Hotels \& Resorts N.V. (PLYA, \$8.47, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. (RHP, \$92.95, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
RLJ Lodging Trust (RLJ, \$13.92, Buy, Gregory Miller)
Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. (SHO, \$11.50, Hold, C. Patrick Scholes)
Travel + Leisure Co. (TNL, \$54.60, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)
Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation (VAC, \$153.75, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)
Wyndham Hotels \& Resorts, Inc. (WH, \$84.14, Buy, C. Patrick Scholes)

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I, C. Patrick Scholes, hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject company(ies) and its (their) securities. I also certify that I have not been, am not, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing the specific recommendation(s) in this report.

I, Gregory J. Miller, hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject company(ies) and its (their) securities. I also certify that I have not been, am not, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing the specific recommendation(s) in this report.

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| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rating | Count | Percent | Rating | Count | Percent |
| Buy | 550 | $70.88 \%$ | Buy | 148 | $26.91 \%$ |
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[^0]:    Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

[^1]:    Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

[^2]:    Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

[^3]:    Source: STR data, Truist Securities research

